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Introduction

Game theory has excisted existed for millennia and has 1 been in applied to many several formssituations; , ranging fromfor example, historical events (such as Spains’ Spain’s rebellion on against Rome in 75 BCE ([McCain 2010), ]), biological models (such as natural selection), market environments (such as oligopolyoligopolies) , politics (such as election bidding), and computer science to name few 2 . This field of applied mathematics captures behaviour behavior  3 in strategic situations (called games ), wherein the success (payoff) of the choice made by an individual (the (player ) is dependent on the choiceesmade choices made by others (other players) (Myerson, 1991) .

The three main mathematical models of games are the extensive form, the strategic form, and the coalition forms,. The bases of difference in one of these models is which differ in terms of the amount of detail provided,: e.g., the players, their preferences, their information, the strategic actions available to them, and how these influence the outcome?. 4

In this paperHerein, we describe the strategic form and study its the underlying phenomena in a business management case of management - labor negotiation at an automobile factory.

The strategic form, also called the normal of a game has much little comprises fewer details compared compared with with the extensive form, in which 5 . For extensive form, the position positions and move moves of the game are closely followed, and the rules define the probable outcomes in planned or random moves (as applies to gambling ). By contrastConversely, in the strategic form, the players players’ choicechoices, i.e., a strategy selected from a set of possible strategies, determines the outcome, iee.or, payoff. All players choose a strategy, and once after the choices are revealed, the game ends with each player getting receiving some payoff. Each player’s payoff is influenced by by eachthe player’s players’ choice choices. Payoffs can be quiet complex entityentities. For our model, we represent payoffs by numerical values. Hence, we assume that the numerical payoffs depend on the choices of all the players.

3 Three  6 objects define the strategic form of a game: 1) the set of players, : N={1,2,…,n}, }; ii 2) the sequence of the players’ strategy sets:, X1,…, Xn, ; and 3) the sequence of player’s pay -off functions, : f(a1,…, an),…, fn(a1, ×××, a n ).

Explanations

Introduction

Game theory has excisted existed for millennia and has 1been in applied to many formssituations; , ranging from historical events (such as Spains’ Spain’s rebellion on against Rome in 75 BCE ([McCain 2010), ]), biological models (such as natural selection), market environments (such as oligopolyoligopolies) , politics (such as election bidding), and computer science to name few 2 . This field of applied mathematics captures behaviour behavior in strategic situations (called games ), wherein the success (payoff) of the choice made by an individual (the (player ) is dependent on the choiceesmade choices made by others (other players) (Myerson, 1991) .

The three main mathematical models of games are the extensive form, the strategic form, and the coalition form. The bases of difference in one each of these models is are the amount of detail provided: the players, their preferences, their information, the strategic actions available to them, and how these influence the outcome?.

In this paper, we describe the strategic form and study its phenomena in a case of business management - labor negotiation at an automobile factory.

The strategic form, also called the normal of a game, has much little fewer details compared with the extensive form. For In the extensive form, the position positions and move moves of the game are closely followed, and the rules define the probable outcomes in planned or random moves (gambling ). By contrast, in the strategic form, the players players’ choice, i.e., a strategy selected from a set of possible strategies, determines the outcome, i.ee., payoff. All players choose a strategy, and once after the choices are revealed, the game ends with each player getting some payoff. Each player’s payoff is influenced by by eachthe player’s players’ choice choices. Payoffs can be quiet complex entityentities 3 . For our model, we represent payoffs by numerical values. Hence, we assume that the numerical payoffs depend on the choices of all the players.

3 Three  4objects define the strategic form of a game: 1) the set of players, : N={1,2,…,n}, }; ii 2) the sequence of the players’ strategy sets:, X1,…, Xn, ; and 3) the sequence of player’s pay -off functions, : f(a1,…, an),…, fn(a1, ×××, a n ).

Explanations

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